Southeast Asia’s increasing interest in BRICS is gaining international attention, as some of the largest ASEAN economies look to deepen engagement with the grouping at a time of growing geopolitical and economic uncertainty.
The move raises questions about the region’s longstanding balancing act between the United States and China, especially as ASEAN nations seek to hedge their bets in an era of intensified global competition. With BRICS expanding its influence and member base, countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia have shown varying degrees of interest in exploring deeper ties, signaling a potential shift in regional alignments.
BRICS, originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has sought to position itself as an alternative to Western-led institutions. The bloc’s recent expansion, which saw the inclusion of new members from the Middle East and Africa, has only strengthened its appeal to emerging economies. This growing influence has not gone unnoticed in Southeast Asia, where nations are navigating the challenge of maintaining economic independence while avoiding entanglement in great-power rivalries. ASEAN has traditionally pursued a neutral stance, but as BRICS expands, the bloc’s economic potential becomes harder to ignore.
For Indonesia, the largest economy in ASEAN, BRICS presents an opportunity to diversify its economic partnerships and enhance its global standing. Indonesian President Joko Widodo has previously expressed interest in closer cooperation with BRICS, and Jakarta’s participation in forums aligned with the group reflects its openness to exploring alternatives to the US-led economic order. Indonesia’s position as a non-aligned nation allows it the flexibility to engage with multiple economic frameworks, and BRICS offers access to a network of emerging markets that could complement its existing ties with both the West and China. At the same time, Indonesia remains cautious about fully aligning with any one camp, as it seeks to maintain good relations with all major global powers.
Thailand, another key ASEAN economy, has also been monitoring BRICS developments with interest. While Bangkok has traditionally been more closely aligned with the US, especially in defense cooperation, its economic policies have leaned towards greater engagement with China in recent years. Thailand’s participation in China-led initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, reflects its pragmatic approach to economic development. The possibility of deeper engagement with BRICS is seen as a way to capitalize on new trade and investment opportunities while maintaining its broader strategic flexibility. However, Thailand, like many other ASEAN nations, is wary of being seen as tilting too far towards one side in the US-China rivalry.
Malaysia has similarly expressed interest in BRICS, with officials highlighting the bloc’s potential as a platform for greater South-South and Southeast cooperation. Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy has traditionally emphasized a balanced approach, and engagement with BRICS aligns with its broader goal of strengthening economic partnerships beyond the Western-dominated financial system. Malaysia’s trade relations with China remain robust, and its participation in BRICS-related discussions is viewed as a pragmatic move to enhance its global economic positioning. Yet, concerns remain about the Southeast political implications of closer alignment with a grouping that includes China and Russia, particularly in light of Malaysia’s strong trade ties with the US and Europe.
The broader geopolitical implications of Southeast ASEAN’s interest in BRICS are significant. The US has long regarded Southeast Asia as a crucial region in its Indo-Pacific strategy, seeking to counterbalance China’s growing influence. Washington has deepened its engagement with ASEAN through initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, while also strengthening security partnerships in the region. However, the appeal of BRICS as an alternative or complementary platform for economic cooperation suggests that ASEAN nations are increasingly looking beyond traditional Western-led frameworks. This shift is not necessarily a rejection of US partnerships but rather a reflection of the region’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy and economic diversification.
China, as a leading member of BRICS, has actively encouraged ASEAN nations to consider greater participation in the bloc’s initiatives. Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia is already extensive, with deep economic ties through trade, investment, and infrastructure projects. The potential expansion of BRICS to include key ASEAN economies would further solidify China’s role as a dominant economic partner in the region. While ASEAN countries seek to benefit from China’s economic rise, they are also aware of the risks of overdependence, particularly in light of growing concerns over Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Russia, another influential BRICS member, has also been courting ASEAN nations. While its economic ties with Southeast Asia are not as extensive as China’s, Russia has sought to deepen engagement through energy cooperation and defense agreements. Moscow’s outreach to ASEAN aligns with its broader strategy of strengthening ties with non-Western economies in response to Western sanctions. For some ASEAN nations, engagement with Russia through BRICS offers opportunities for economic diversification, particularly in areas such as energy security. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia present challenges for deeper cooperation, as Southeast ASEAN countries must carefully navigate the potential diplomatic repercussions.
